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CASE NOTES
judicial interpretation of comment k to section 402A of the Restatement.
This interpretation clearly exempts retail druggists who properly fill a
prescription from the wide ambit of "sellers" sought to be included in the
coverage of section 402A. The court in the McLeod case expressed the
view that druggists as a generic group are not included within the cover-
age of section 402A, and therefore it was not necessary to decide whether
a druggist performs a service, as claimed by the defendants, or is a seller.
However, the fact remains that the court excluded a specific group from
the scope of section 402A.
Henry Novoselsky
TORTS-PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE-WILFUL
AND NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
An action was brought by an unemancipated eleven year old minor
against his father for injuries sustained when he was struck by an auto
driven by his intoxicated father. In the trial court, the judge ruled that
an unemancipated minor could not sue his parent in tort, and the action
was dismissed.' The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the trial court and
held that the minor could recover, since the defendant, who drove while
intoxicated and at high speed, was guilty of wilful and negligent conduct.
Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 205 N.E.2d 586 (1965).
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals disregarded the de-
fendant's plea of Parental Immunity, a doctrine first established without
precedent in Hewlett v. George,2 which involved a wilful tort. In the
Hewlett case, the Parental Immunity doctrine was established on the
basis of the court's interpretation of public policy.3 The court refused to
put family harmony in jeopardy by allowing a daughter, under her par-
ent's control, the right to recover from her parent. Since 1891, courts
dealing with suits between parents and children have had to cope with
the Hewlett doctrine that a child may not sue his parent in tort. Many
courts have applied it strictly, some have excused themselves from its
scope due to particular circumstances, and a few have almost entirely
abrogated it.
1 Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 505, 205 N.E.2d 586, 487. In the Com-
mon Pleas Court the defendant was granted judgment after a motion for a Directed
Verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's opening statement.
268 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Action was on behalf of an unemancipated minor
against her mother for having, "Willfully, illegally, and maliciously caused her to be
imprisoned for ten days in the East Mississippi insane asylum." (ld. at 704, 9 So. at 886.)
3 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 886: "But as long as the parent is under obligation to care for
[the minor] the best interests of society forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court." It is of particular interest to note that in this case, the parent publically de-
nounced and rejected the child, and thus, no family harmony existed to be preserved.
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The decisions dealing with the question of Parental Immunity in tort
have divided parent-child suits into three categories; those involving wil-
ful torts, those involving ordinary negligence and those involving injuries
occurring while the parent is engaged in a business activity. A separate
body of law has evolved around each category and only in some instances
have corollaries been drawn between the three categories.
The Teramano decision joins the ranks of those cases aimed at convert-
ing Parental Immunity from a doctrine to an exception. It represents
Ohio's first deviation from the Parental Immunity precedent in the case
of a wilful tort and adds impetus to a growing trend away from the
precedent. The court placed major reliance upon three cases, 4 each of
which was singularly significant in limiting the use of the Parental Im-
munity doctrine. In Borst v. Borst," the reasoning that supported the im-
munity rule was strongly criticized, and Signs v. Signs6 was cited because
it was Ohio's first departure from strict adherence to the Parental Im-
munity concept. Cogwill v. BloockJ in which the factual situation was
similar to the Teramano case, allowed recovery on the grounds that the
"wrongful conduct of the father in driving the automobile while drunk
is in no way referable to his duties as a parent. Indeed, in this case there
was a clear abandonment of the parental duty."8
Parental Immunity began as a simple rule, designed to protect family
unity, that soon blossomed into a doctrine burdened with considerations
and complications. Courts were continually questioned about the applica-
bility of the rule when the parent's estate9 or liability insurance was in-
volved.10 Many courts advanced arguments in support of the doctrine
while others sought to negate it."
4Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Cowgill v. Bloock, 189
Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
5Borst v. Borst, supra note 4. Reference to the Borst case will show all of the major
arguments advanced against the Parental Immunity Doctrine.
0 Signs v. Signs, supra note 4.
7 Cowgill v. Bloock, supra note 4. 8 Id. at 293, 218 P.2d at 450.
9Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960). The doctrine of Parental
Immunity was not applied to the parent's estate since there could be no disruption
of family unity. Contra, Dunlevy v. Butler, 64 D. &C. 535, 62 York 117 (1948). The
doctrine was extended to prevent the child from suing the father's estate. The court
ruled that only a suit maintainable against the actual parent could be maintained against
the estate.
10 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930), wherein recovery was allowed
against the parent because of the presence of insurance. Contra, Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923), wherein recovery was not allowed the child, though
the parent was insured.
11 See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv.
1030, 1070-77 (1930). Mr. McCurdy discusses at length the following factors considered
CASE NOTES
In the area of wanton and wilful torts, where the doctrine originated,
the trend since 1950 has been to negate the doctrine and allow the minor
to recover. The Cowgill case was among the first in a series of decisions
to allow an unemancipated child to sue his parent for a wilful tort. 12 The
decisions that followed raised speculation as to whether any "present-day
court would apply the strict immunity doctrine in favor of a parent who
was found guilty of intentional, criminal conduct."'13 This prediction
would appear to be substantiated by the recent Teramano decision and
the all encompassing holding in Goller v. White.1 4
Deviation from the immunity doctrine has also been noticeable in cases
involving injuries to children while their parents are engaged in their
courses of employment and business activities. This trend to eliminate
Parental Immunity, unlike the trend in wilful torts, did not take sixty
years to erupt, yet both trends developed in questioning the reasons be-
hind the original Hewlett decision.' 5 Of prime importance was the case
of Dunlap v. Dunlap.6 This case opened a Pandora's box of suits for
injuries occurring while the parent was engaged in a business activity. 17
Although the doctrine was advocated by the defendant, the court ignored
the Hewlett precedent, stating
It]here never has been a common-law rule that a child could not [recover from]
its parents. It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with [the idea of
Parental Immunity], and to treat the suits which have been allowed as excep-
tions to a general rule.' 8
The Court did not consider Parental Immunity as a doctrine standing at
the core of the law-rather, it was a rule at the fringes of the law prevent-
by the courts in applying the immunity rule: (1) danger of fraud, (2) possibility of
succession (i.e. that the parent will inherit the child's funds should the child die),
(3) family exchequer (the depletion of the parent's funds to the child's detriment),
(4) denial of causes of action between husband and wife, (5) domestic tranquility, and
(6) parental discipline and control.
12 Cowgill v. Bloock, supra note 4. See also, Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289
P.2d 218 (1955); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Mahnkov
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Ball v. Ball, 269 P.2d 302 (Wyo. 1954);
Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Siembab v. Siembab, 284
App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954).
18 See Comment, 10 DEPAUL L. REv. 55, 56 (1960).
14 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). This decision is the most radical to date
in its view of Parental Immunity. The court stated that Parental Immunity should be
abrogated in all but two instances. These are discussed, infra note 28.
15 Supra note 2. 16 Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 10.
17 Ibid. The plaintiff was injured under circumstances showing a master's liability
for injury to a servant.
IsId. at 354, 150 Ad. at 906 (1930).
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ing particular suits. 9 Certainly the best interests of society were not
served by denying liability. Family unit and harmony were not jeopard-
ized because the father was covered by employer's liability insurance, and
with the burden of suit shifted to a non-family entity, the Parental Im-
munity rule was conveniently set aside.20
Regarding the holding of the Dunlap decision, similar suits were sanc-
tioned by the courts further attacking the logic of the Hewlett doctrine.21
This series of inroads on Parental Immunity culminated with the Borst
case, wherein the court advanced the theory that the Hewlett doctrine
was inapplicable and illogical.22 This trend has not been universally ac-
cepted, because not all jurists are ready to remove the cloak of immunity
merely because the parent is engaged in a business activity.23
The majority of courts have not permitted minors to recover against
parents for injuries sustained as a result of the parent's ordinary negligence
and have repeatedly allowed Parental Immunity to be used as a successful
defense.24 The public policy argument voiced in the Hewlett decision was
held not to exist in the Teramano case, although both cases involved wan-
ton and wilful torts. Yet, this public policy argument has been said to
exist in ordinary negligence cases. One court 25 reaffirmed this position by
holding that an unemancipated minor child could not sue her father for
a mistake in judgment behind the wheel. The court stated that
[t]o entertain the present suit, would be to open the doors of the courts to every
minor child who has suffered an injury, real or imaginary, at the hands of its
parents on account of their neglect, or want of due care, in providing for or
looking after its welfare. This, to say the least, would be unseemly if not
productive of great mischief.2 6
19 Id. at 358, 150 A. at 908 (1930). The court stated that "the first judicial precedent
for the non-liability rule is Hewlett v. George [and] what this case really did was to
establish a new rule of exceptional character rather than enforce a rule already
established."
20Id. at 372, 150 A. at 915 (1930). "Such immunity as the parent may have from suit
by the minor child for personal tort, arises from a isability to sue [but] the disability
is not absolute. It is imposed for the protection of family control and harmony, and
exists only where a suit . . . might disturb the family relations . . .It does not apply
to ... a case where liability has been transferred to a third party."
21 E.g., Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Signs v. Signs, supra note 6.
22 Burst v. Burst, supra note 4 at 648-653, 251 P. 2d at 153-156 (shows how the court
reached this conclusion).
23 Id. at 659, 251 P.2d at 157 (1952). Judge Schwellenbach entered a strong dissention
because of the possibility of fraud and collusion.
24 See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Nelson v. Richwagon, 326
Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950); Durham v. Durham, 85 So.2d 807 (Miss. 1956); Strong
v. Strong, 269 P.2d 265 (Nev. 1954); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 250 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn.
1952). Contra, supra note 14.
25 Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E.12 (1923).
26 Id. at 579, 118 S.E. at 13 (1923).
CASE NOTES
In the Teramano case, the defendant's actions while intoxicated were not
excusable by the Parental Immunity doctrine because they were wanton
and wilful acts rather than acts of ordinary negligence.
After ascertaining the nature of the neglect, the question of whether
the parent was engaged in an activity related to his parental duties must
also be determined. When the parent's conduct is "found to be mere
negligence, as opposed to an act of cruelty sufficient to sever the parental
relationship . . . the action would necessarily fail.1'27 Though Parental
Immunity is strongly entrenched in ordinary negligence cases, there are
those who would seek to remove it. The court in the Goller case advo-
cated that Parental Immunity
[olught to be abrogated except in these two situations: (1) where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care.28
To date, this position has been the most extreme.29
Unquestionably, the Hewlett doctrine of Parental Immunity has been
diluted, and it is misleading to refer to it as a doctrine. It is foreseeable
that most courts will probably concur with Wisconsin's Goller decision
abrogating Parental Immunity in all but the two above-mentioned in-
stances. 30 What remains to be answered is whether the individual states
will follow the argument that only legislation should abrogate Parental
Immunity.8 ' The Illinois Supreme Court in Nudd v. Matsoukas,'2 faced
with just this problem, reached the conclusion that Parental Immunity
should not be altered by the legislature, stating
[wle do not feel that the announcement of this doctrine should be left to the
legislature. The doctrine of Parental Immunity, as far as it goes was created by
the courts. It is especially for them to interpret and modify that doctrine to cor-
respond with prevalent considerations of public policy and social need.3 8
In the past fifteen years, application of the Parental Immunity doctrine
has been curtailed through the efforts of state courts and legislatures.
Progress has been made towards diminishing its scope and we can no
longer refer to the 1891 Hewlett decision as the precedent for Parental
Immunity. The aforementioned decisions were instrumental in effecting
a change in this precedent which, accented by Teramano and other recent
27 Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952).
28 Supra note 14 at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198 (1963).
29 Comment, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 247 (1963).
8o Supra note 14 at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
81 See Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937).
827 II. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
331d. at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531 (1956).
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cases, seems to be a growing and continuing trend. The conclusions of
the Teramano case were preceded by the Illinois court's decision in the
Nudd case,34 which rejected Parental Immunity as to wanton and wilful
torts. The court succinctly stated that
[w]hile this policy might be such justification to prevent suits for mere negli-
gence within the scope of the parental relationship we do not conceive that
public policy should prevent a minor from obtaining redress for wilful and
wanton misconduct on the part of a parent.85
In view of such statements it is inevitable that the doctrine of Parental
Immunity will eventually disappear and be replaced by a more appropriate
doctrine which imposes Parental Liability in all cases except those in-
volving ordinary negligence.8 6
Melvin Rishe
84 Supra note 32.
35 Supra note 32 at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531 (1956).
86 The apparent trend to allow minors to recover against their parents for injuries
sustained through wanton torts or while the parent is engaged in a business activity
indicates that "Parental Immunity" is too inclusive a term. "Parental Liability except
in ordinary negligence cases" would be a more accurate and descriptive title for this
tort area.
TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY-PRIVITY AS A DEFENSE
FOR A NON-NEGLIGENT MANUFACTURER
On February 11, 1957, Messrs. Suvada and Konecnik purchased a re-
conditioned tractor-trailer from White Motor Company. The unit was
equipped with a braking system manufactured by co-defendant, Bendix.
On June 24, 1960, while plaintiffs' agent was driving the tractor, the
brake system failed due to a defective component part and the tractor
collided with a passenger bus, causing personal injuries to several passen-
gers and damaging the bus and plaintiffs' tractor-trailer. The plaintiffs
were compelled to pay personal injury claims to the injured bus passengers,
the cost of repairs to the bus, and the repairs on their tractor unit. Sub-
sequently, they filed an indemnity suit against the defendants, predicating
liability on the grounds of negligence and breach of implied warranty.
The trial court sustained Bendix's motion to strike the warranty count
upon the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege privity of contract.
On plaintiffs' appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that plaintiff's had
stated causes of action against defendants and reversed the trial court.'
1 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 111. App.2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964).
